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Abstract 
The main contribution of this paper is twofold. Firstly, it focuses on the decisional process 
that leads to the creation of a social norm. Secondly, it analyses the mechanisms through 
which subjects conform their behaviour to the norm. In particular, our aim is to study the role 
and  the  nature  of  Normative  and  Empirical  Expectations  and  their  influence  on  people’s 
decisions. The tool is the Exclusion Game, a sort of ‘triple mini-dictator game’. This is a 
situation  where  3  subjects  –  players  A  -  have  to  decide  how  to  allocate  a  sum  S  among 
themselves and a fourth subject - player B - who has no decisional power. The experiment 
consists of three treatments. In the Baseline Treatment participants are randomly distributed 
in  groups  of  four  players  and  play  the  Exclusion  Game.  In  the  Agreement  Treatment 
participants in each group are invited to vote for a specific non-binding allocation rule before 
playing the Exclusion Game. In the Outsider Treatment, following the voting procedure and 
before the Exclusion Game is played, a player A for each group (the outsider) is reassigned to 
a different group and instructed on the rule chosen by the new group. In all the treatments, at 
the end of the game and before players are informed about the decisions taken during the 
Exclusion  Game  by  the  other  co-players,  first  order  and  second  order  expectations  (both 
normative  and  empirical)  are  elicited  by  means  of  a  brief  questionnaire.  The  first  result 
obtained is that subjects’ choices are in line with their empirical (not normative) expectations. 
The second result is that even a non-binding agreement induces a convergence of empirical 
expectations – and, consequently, of choices. The third result is that expectation of conformity 
is higher in the partner protocol. This implies that a single outsider disrupts the ‘conditional 
compliance’ equilibrium. 
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Introduction 
In recent years the concept of social norm has become very popular among 
behavioral and experimental economists interested in deviations from purely 
selfish behavior. Notwithstanding the increasing attention paid to the concept, 
a systematic study of social norms as motivational drivers for economic agents 
is still lacking. At empirical level,  no or little effort has been made to find a 
way to observe the creation of social norms in the laboratory. At theoretical 
level, the social preferences (Bolton, 1991; Bolton and Ockenfelds 1998; Fehr 
and Schmidt, 1999; Charness and Rabin, 2002) and reciprocity models (Rabin, 
1993;  Falk  and  Fischbacher,  2006)  incorporate  normative  principles  within 
individual  preferences  instead  of  treating  them  as  separate  objects.  This 
prevents explanation of compliance with a social norm in a context where the 
norm  prescribes  a  choice  which  implies  a  cost  in  terms  of  material  self 
interest,  where  external  enforcement  (through  sanctions  or  rewards)  is  not 
feasible (for example, due to imperfect monitoring), and where reputational 
mechanisms cannot be effective due to ex-post non-verifiability or to the fact 
that the interaction is one-shot (Faillo and Sacconi, 2007). 
In  what  follows  we  seek  to  fill  these  gaps  by  describing a n  experimental 
procedure  in  which  a  norm  is  created  by  means  of  an  ex-ante  impartial 
agreement among the members of a group. In particular, we consider a context 
in which the norm arises from agreement on a rule on how to play a one-shot 
game which follows the agreement, and in which subjects must decide how to 
divide  a  sum  of  money  among  themselves.  The  agreement  is  reached  by 
subjects who vote for the rule behind a veil of ignorance, i.e. before they know 
what their role in the game will be. By means of this procedure we reproduced 
in  the  laboratory  a  situation  in  which  the  subjects  first  participated  in  a  
“constitutional” stage in definition of a non-binding norm and then discovered 
their roles in the game and decided whether or not to comply with the norm.   
We explain the subjects’ decision to comply with the norm in this specific 
context in two steps. First, we posit a “conditional compliance” hypothesis, 
according  to  which,  in  a  strategic  interaction  among  N  players,  player  i's   3 
decision to comply with a shared norm dictating a choice in contrast with her 
material  self-interest  depends  on  her  beliefs  about  the  other  N-1  players’ 
choices and beliefs.  
Second,  assuming  that  the  “conditional  compliance”  hypothesis  holds,  we 
examine the agreement’s role in inducing compliance by the subjects.  In this 
regard, we can distinguish between two approaches to the question  of  how 
the agreement – which in standard non cooperative game theory is just ‘cheap 
talk’ –  influences the subjects’ decision to comply. According to the first 
approach, the agreement performs a key role, and if it is associated with the 
appropriate  expectations  of  reciprocal  compliance,  it  induces  subjects  to 
comply.  According to the second approach,  the agreement is not important in 
itself. What matters is the presence of expectations about the existence of a 
norm (which may also originate  from experience, education, communication 
etc.) which constitute the basis for the emergence of normative expectations .  
A  further  question  to  be  addressed  concerns  the  relationship  between  the 
agreement  and  the  emergence  of  expectations  of  reciprocal  conformity.  
Sacconi and Faillo (2008)  show that, for a significant number of subjects, the 
agreement  is  a  sufficient  condition  to  expect  reciprocal  conformity,  and 
therefore to comply with the rule. As discussed elsewhere (Faillo and Sacconi, 
2007),  an  appropriate  explanation  for t his  finding  cannot  be  based  on  a 
standard logical inference – according to which the existence of  expectations 
of reciprocal conformity derives from the existence of the agreement – but 
should be based on non-monotonic logic and  default reasoning. 
 
The foregoing  discussion can be further developed by looking at the few 
attempts made in the behavioral economics literature to devise a theory on 
conformity with social norms. In particular, we can identify two alternative 
interpretations of the “conditional compliance” hypothesis, which differ also 
in terms of the role assigned to the impartial agreement  in explanation of 
norm  compliance.  Sacconi  and  Grimalda  (2007)  develop  a  model  of 
conformist preferences based on psychological game theory. According to this 
model,  a  player  characterized  by  conformist  preferences  complies  if  she   4 
participates  in  choosing  the  norm  in  a  social  contract  setting  (i.e.  she 
participates in an ex-ante agreement on the norm), if she expects that other 
players  who  have  contributed  to  choose  the  rule  will  comply  (First  Order 
Empirical Expectations) and if she expects that others will expect that she will 
comply (Second Order Empirical Expectations). 
Cristina Bicchieri (2006) argues that compliance is observed when the player 
is aware of the norm’s existence (the agreement is not necessary) and believes 
that a sufficiently large number of people comply with the norm (First Order 
Empirical Expectations); and either a sufficiently large number of people think 
that she ought to conform or a sufficiently large number of people are ready to 
sanction her for not conforming (Second Order Normative Expectations).  
Bicchieri and Xiao (2007) run an experiment in which they show that, when 
normative expectations (what we believe others think ought to be done) and 
empirical expectations (what we expect others will actually do) are in contrast, 
subjects choose according to the latter.
1 
There are apparent similarities, but also important differences, between these 
two theories and the guilt aversion model (Charness and Dufwenberg, 2006; 
Battigalli and Dufwenberg, 2007). According to the guilt aversion hypothesis, 
people care about what others expect them to do and feel guilty if they do not 
fulfill what they think are others’ expectations. As in conformist preferences 
and  Bicchieri’s  theory,  people’s  behavior  depends  on  their  second  order 
(empirical)  beliefs;  but  differently  from  these  two  theories,  in  the  guilt 
aversion model first order beliefs are not considered as drivers of individual 
choice. 
 
In order to take account of the alternative interpretations of the “conditional 
compliance”  hypothesis,  in  our  experiment  we  investigated  four  types  of 
expectations of a generic player i: 
                                                 
1  Further  evidence  on  the  role  of  empirical  and  normative  expectations  in  fostering  
compliance with norms of fairness can be found  in a recent paper by Krupka and Weber 
(2007).    5 
First Order Empirical Expectations (FOEE): player i’s beliefs about the other 
players’ choices. 
Second Order Empirical Expectations (SOEE): player i’s beliefs about other 
players’ beliefs about her choice. 
First Order Normative Expectations (FONE): player i’s beliefs about what is 
the right choice in a particular situation. 
Second Order Normative Expectations (SONE): player i’s beliefs about what 
other players consider as the right choice in a particular situation. 
 
We studied the effect of the agreement on the emergence of different types of 
expectations, and the contribution of these different types of expectations to  
explanation of the decision to comply with a shared norm. We considered a 
simple game, and we started by studying the relationship between choice and 
expectations. To this end, we observed how the subjects played the game and 
we collected data on what they believed others would do and expect. We then 
added analysis of how the introduction (before the actual playing of the game) 
of  an  agreement  on  a  non-binding  division  rule  influenced  the  subjects’ 
expectations,  and  consequently  the  way  in  which  the  game  was  played. 
Finally, we considered the case in which subjects played the game with co-
players who were not those with whom they had participated in the agreement. 
 As  will  become  clearer  below,  these  steps  corresponded  to  the  three 
treatments  of  our  experimental  design:  the  Baseline  Treatment  (BT),  the 
Agreement Treatment (AT), and the Outsider Treatment (OT). The BT gave us 
general information about the relationship between choice and empirical and 
normative expectations. The comparison between what we observed in BT and 
AT enabled us to examine the influence of the agreement on expectations and 
choice  and  to  identify  the  roles  of  the  different  types  of  expectations    in 
inducing compliance with the norm. Finally, by comparing the AT with OT 
we could assess whether being in a group with individuals who had not been 
their partner in the agreement influenced the subjects’ decision to comply. 
   6 
The  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  describes  the  experimental 
design,  procedure  and  hypotheses,  while  Section  3  analyses  the  results.  A 
discussion of the results and some concluding remarks end the paper (Section 
4). 
 
2. Experimental Design 
The tool used was the Exclusion Game (Sacconi and Faillo, 2005; Faillo and 
Sacconi, 2007), a sort of ‘triple mini-dictator game’. This is a situation where 
3 subjects – players A (A1, A2 and A3 respectively) – must decide how to 
allocate a sum S among themselves and a fourth subject – player B – who has 
no decisional power. In particular, A1, A2 and A3 have to decide separately 
and  independently  the  amount  that  they  want  to  request  for  themselves, 
choosing one of three possible strategies: asking for 25%, 30% or 33% of S. 
The payoff for players A is exactly the sum requested for themselves (a1, a2 
and a3 respectively), while the payoff for player B is the remaining sum (S – 
a1 – a2 – a3). In our experiment, each group was given 60 tokens – each token 
corresponded to   0.50 – and each player A’s strategies were : “Ask for 15 
tokens”, “Ask for 18 tokens”, “Ask for 20 tokens”. 
The experiment consisted of three treatments: the Baseline Treatment (BT), the 
Agreement Treatment (AT) and the Outsider Treatment (OT).  
In the Baseline Treatment  participants were randomly distributed in groups of 
four players and played the Exclusion Game.  
In the Agreement Treatment participants were randomly distributed in groups 
of four players and were told about the stages of the experiment and about the 
Exclusion Game. In the first stage, without knowing their role in the game, 
they took part in a voting procedure. In each group participants were invited to 
vote for a specific allocation rule. In particular, subjects had to vote for one of 
three alternative rules (the fourth number was the type B player’s payoff): 
{15,15, 15,15},{18,18, 18,6}, {20,20, 20,0}. The first rule assigned the same 
payoff to every member of the group; the second rule corresponded to a partial 
inclusion of player B in the share-out the money; the third rule implied the   7 
total  exclusion  of  the  type B   player.
2  Players  had  to  reach  a  unanimous 
agreement on the rule within a limited number of trials (10 in our experiment). 
Voting was computerized and completely anonymous. The agreement was not 
binding, but failure in reaching it was costly, since only groups who reached 
agreement  in  this  first  stage  could  participate  in  the  second  stage.  In  the 
second stage the composition of the groups was unchanged and roles were 
randomly assigned to implement the Exclusion Game. In this case, players A 
could either decide to implement the rule selected by vote or choose one of the 
alternative allocations. Players who did not enter the second stage waited until 
the end of the session. Their payoff was the show-up fee.  
In the OT participants were randomly distributed in groups of four players, and 
they were instructed on the stages of the experiment and on the Exclusion 
Game. The first stage, as well as the rule on entering the second stage, were 
the same as in the AT. At the beginning of the second stage, players were 
informed about their role, and groups were rematched. In particular, a player A 
for  each  group  (the  outsider)  was  reassigned  to  a  different  group  and  told 
about the rule chosen by the new group, while the other members of the group 
did not know what rule the outsider’s previous group had adopted. After the 
re-matching, the subjects played the Exclusion Game. For a summary of the 









                                                 
2 Note the correspondence between the rules and the strategies of the Exclusion Game: for 
players A compliance with the {15,15,15,15} rule implies choice of the “ask for 15 tokens” 
strategy;  compliance with the {18,18,18,7} rule implies choice of the “ask for 18 tokens” 
strategy; and, finally, compliance with the {20,20,20,0} rule implies choice of the “ask for 120 
tokens” strategy   8 
2.1 Experimental Procedure.  
The  experiment  was  run  in  both  Milan  (EELAB  –  University  of  Milan 
Bicocca) and Trento (CEEL – University of Trento)
 3. We ran 3 sessions for 
the BT (1 in Milan and 2 in Trento), 4 sessions for the AT (2 in Milan and 2 in 
Trento), 5 sessions for the OT (3 in Milan and 2 in Trento). Overall, 216 
undergraduate students – 104 in Milan and 112 in Trento – participated in the 
experiment. A more detailed description of the sessions is given in Table 1. 
The experiment was programmed and conducted using the z-Tree software 
(Fischbacher,  2007).  The  instructions  were  read  by  participants  on  their 
computer screen while an experimenter read them out loud.
4  
After the instructions had been read, and before the subjects were invited to 
take their decisions, some control questions were asked in order to ensure that 
the players had understood the rules of the game. At the end of each session, 
subjects  were  asked  to  fill  in  a  questionnaire  for  the  collection  of  socio-
demographic data. 
Players were given a show-up fee of 3 euros.  
 
2.2 Beliefs elicitation.  
In all the treatments, at the end of the game and before players were informed 
about the decisions taken during the Exclusion Game by the other co-players, 
first order and second order expectations (both normative and empirical) were 
elicited by means of a brief questionnaire. In particular, in each group each 
player made statements concerning:  
1.  the  probabilities  of  each  possible  choice  by  co-players  A  (First  Order 
Empirical Expectations);  
                                                 
3 At the University of Trento, subjects were recruited by posting ads in various departments. 
Ads were posted one week before the experiment. Enrolments by students interested in taking 
part  in  the  experiment  were  collected  by  the  staff  of  the  Computable  and  Experimental 
Economics Laboratory (CEEL) of the University of Trento. 
At the University of Milano-Bicocca subjects were recruited by email. They were students on 
the  mailing  list  of  the  Experimental  Economics  Laboratory  of  the  University  of  Milano-
Bicocca (EELAB). Two weeks before the experiment they received an email inviting them to 
visit the Laboratory’s website for information about the experiment and subscriptions. 
4 The instructions and the program are available upon request.   9 
2. the probability of each co-player’s possible judgement about her own choice 
(Second Order Empirical Expectations);  
3. the choice she considered to be the ‘right’ one A (First Order Normative 
Expectations);  
4. the choice that co-players considered to be the ‘right’ one (Second Order 
Normative Expectations).
5 
In the OT, guesses about the behaviour and beliefs of partners and outsiders 
were elicited separately. 
Only good guesses of the Empirical Expectations were rewarded on the basis 
of a quadratic scoring rule (Davis and Holt, 1993).
6 
 
2.3 Experimental Hypotheses.  
Hypothesis  1  (H1):  According  to  psychological  game  theory,
7  people’s 
preferences  depend  on  their  expectations  (of  different  orders  and  nature). 
Consequently, the players’ choices in the Exclusion Game could be explained 
in terms of their expectations about the behaviour of the other players.  
Moreover,  if  Bicchieri  and  Xiao  (2007)  are  right,  when  normative  and 
empirical expectations are in contrast, the latter play a more important role in 
players’ decision-making. 
 
Hypothesis 2 (H2): In treatments AT and OT, agreement should be reached by 
all the groups because it is not binding but its failure is costly (failure would 
prevent the players from entering the second stage of the experiment). 
 
Hypothesis  3  (H3):  The  possibility  of  agreeing  with  a  distributive  norm 
enhances compliance by inducing a convergence of individual expectations. In 
                                                 
5 See appendix 1 for details on the belief elicitation procedure. 
6 We used the following scoring rule: 
 
 
where  Ik  takes value 1 if the event realized is event k and 0 otherwise. pk is the probability 
associated with event k. The maximum score is a, and the minimum score is a-2b. We chose  
a=2 e b=1.   
7 See for example Geanakoplos et al. (1989); Rabin, (1993); Dufwenberg (2006)   10 
other  words,  compliance  can  be  explained  in  terms  of  the  emergence  of 
reciprocal expectations of conformity due to the agreement (this hypothesis is 
compatible  with  both  Sacconi  and  Grimalda’s  theory  of  conformist 
preferences and Bicchieri’s theory of social norms).  
 
Hypothesis  3a  (H3a):,  subjects  will  comply  if  i)  they  believe  that  other 
members  of  their  group  will  comply  (First  Order  Empirical  Expectations 
compatible with the choice dictated by the rule) and if ii) they believe that 
other  members  of  the  group  think  that  complying  is  the  right  thing  to  do 
(Second Order Normative Expectations compatible with the choice dictated by 
the rule) (this hypothesis is compatible with Bicchieri’s theory) 
 
Hypothesis  3b  (H3b):  subjects  will  comply  if  i)  they  participate  in  the 
agreement on the rule; ii) they believe that other members of their group will 
comply  (First  Order  Empirical  Expectations  compatible  with  the  choice 
dictated by the rule) and if iii) they believe that other members of the group 
expect  that  they  will  comply  (Second  Order  Empirical  Expectations 
compatible with the choice dictated by the rule). With respect to point (i), 
compliance should be less frequent in the OT treatment, where groups are re-
matched (this hypothesis is compatible with Sacconi and Grimalda’s theory of 
conformist preferences). 
 
3. Data analysis 
In this section we provide an overview of our experimental data and results by 
discussing two main points. First, we analyse the relation between beliefs and 
behaviour: in particular, we shall check whether beliefs influence the subjects’ 
decision-making process. Second, we test whether and how different scenarios 
influence beliefs and, consequently, people’s decisions. 
 
 
   11 
 
3.1 Description 
Overall, 216 undergraduate students took part in the experiment. 56 players 
were  recruited  for  the  BT,  72  for  the  AT,  and  88  for  the  OT.  We  have 
observations of 42  subjects A in the BT, 54 in the AT, and 66 in the OT.  
In the BT, the majority of players A chose to ask for the highest amount of 
tokens (20) – 73.8% against the 21.4% who chose 18 and the 4.8% who chose 
15. The situation is different in both the AT and the OT. In the AT, 37%, 
16.7%  and  46.3%  chose  respectively  20,  18  and  15;  inn  the  OT  the 
percentages are 54.5%, 12.1% and 33.4%. 
As regards the rule voted for, the 15-15-15-15 rule seems to have been the 
preferred option in both the AT and the OT. In particular, 17 groups out of 18 
in the AT and 20 out of 22 in the OT chose the fair-division rule. The 18-18-
18-6 rule was chosen by 1 group in the AT and by 1 group in the OT; only 1 
group in the OT chose the 20-20-20-0 rule. 50% of players in the AT and 




Result 1. The subjects’ choices are in line with their expectations. 
On checking for correlation between beliefs and decisions, we find that most 
of  the  players’  choices  are  in  line  with  either  empirical  or  normative 
expectations (Table 2).
8 However – as in Bicchieri and Xiao (2007) – when 
normative and empirical expectations are in contrast, the latter play a more 
important  role  in  the  players’  decision-making  (Table  3)  and  they  are 
significantly correlated to the subjects’ choices (Spearman test; p < 0.03). This 




                                                 
8 We consider only first order expectations since second order expectations are either equal or 
highly correlated to the former. For a more detailed description, see Appendix 1. 
9 Test run only on observations where FONE and FOEE are different.    12 
Result 2. When agreement is possible, it  reached by all groups. Almost all 
groups  agree on the 15-15-15-15 rule.  
As we expected, when agreement is possible, it is reached by all groups. This 
is a quite obvious result: agreement is not binding but failure  in reaching it is 
costly. However, the interesting point is that the fair rule 15-15-15-15 seems to 
be a sort of focal point (see Table 4). What this means can be explained by 
looking at the results of the first voting attempt. Table 5 shows that the first 
choice of 75% of players in the AT and 70% of players in the OT is the 15-15-
15-15 rule. On running a binomial test (choosing the 15-15-15-15 rule against 
choosing another rule) we find that these values are significant (p = 0.000 in 
the AT and p = 0.04 in the OT). This may imply that most subjects knew 
perfectly well what was right. However, what happened to the remaining 25% 
and  30%?  Why  did  most  of  them  changed  their  minds?  And  why,  when 
playing the Exclusion Game, did 50% of subjects in the AT and 61% in the 
OT decide not to comply with the rule (Table 6)? A possible explanation is 
that ‘unfair’ subjects voted for the non-binding ‘fair’ rule in order to end the 
time-consuming voting procedure. However, this was not enough for players 
who preferred the ‘fair’ rule. They knew perfectly well that the agreement was 
not binding (in fact, among players who eventually voted for a rule different 
from their first choice, 71% did not comply with it when playing the Exclusion 
Game) and if they thought that the other co-players were not complying, they 
probably  defected  as  well.  This  would  be  in  line  both  with  the  fact  that 
empirical expectations are more important than normative ones, and with the 
higher probability of expecting the others to choose 20 (at least in the AT) as 
soon as the number of voting rounds increased (see Appendix 2).  
 
 
Result 3. Agreement induces convergence of empirical expectations.  
In the BT at least 70% of the players asked for 20, while in the AT only 37% 
of  the  participants  asked  for  the  maximum.  This  difference  is  significant   13 
(Mann-Whitney
10; p = 0.0002). However, our experimental hypothesis is more 
complicated and implies that our participants engage in a two-step reasoning 
process. Step 1: the agreement influences the players’ empirical expectations. 
Step 2: empirical expectations define the subjects’ choices. This means that we 
want to show that the difference between BT and AT is a consequence of the 
impact of the agreement on players’ beliefs and preferences.  
In the AT, 17 groups out of 18 chose the 15-15-15-15 rule, and 1 chose 
the 18-18-18-6 one. On analysing the subjects’ expectations, we find that in 
the AT there is a significant decrease of subjects who think that the other 
members  of  their  group  have  asked  for  20  tokens  (Table  7).  A  probit 
regression – where the dependent variable is the probability of expecting the 
others to choose 20 – shows that subjects are more likely to expect selfish 
behaviour by the co-players in the BT (p = 0.000). A bivariate recursive probit 
confirms both the influence of beliefs on the subjects’ decisions (p = 0.00) and 
the convergence of empirical expectations on a choice in line with the fair rule 
(p = 0.000).
11 More details on the econometric analysis are given in Appendix 
2. 
 
Result 4. Expectation of conformity is higher in the partner protocol. 
When we introduce a mixed protocol whereby the Exclusion Game is played 
in groups where one subject is an ‘outsider’ (in the OT), a lower percentage of 
players  comply  with  the  chosen  rule  (Table  6).  Again,  our  experimental 
hypothesis is that our participants engage in a two-step reasoning process. Step 
1:  the  introduction  of  an  outsider  influences  the  players’  empirical 
expectations. Step 2: empirical expectations define  the subjects’ choices. This 
means that, once again, we want to show that the difference between AT and 
OT is a consequence of the impact of the outsider on players’ beliefs. If we 
analyse expectations, it turns out that in the AT players believe in their co-
players’ compliance more than in the OT (Table 8). A probit regression – 
                                                 
10 Independent observations are average choices of each group so as to take account of the fact 
that choices within the same group in the AT are not independent.  
11 This result is perfectly in line with the result obtained by Sacconi and Faillo (2005) using a 
within-subject design.   14 
where  the  dependent  variable  is  the  probability  of  expecting  the  others  to 
comply – shows that subjects are more likely to expect compliance in the AT 
(p = 0.046). A bivariate recursive probit confirms both the influence of beliefs 
on the subjects’ decisions (p = 0.012) and the fact that in the OT subjects are 
more likely to expect deviation by the co-players from the chosen rule. (p = 
0.051). More details on the econometric analysis are given in Appendix 2. 
 
Result 5. The existence of normative expectations in line with the shared norm 
is  not a necessary condition for compliance.  
The  previous  analyses  confirm  the  robustness  of  Sacconi  and  Grimalda’s 
theory.  According  to  hypothesis  H3a,  First  Order  Empirical  Expectations 
(FOEE)  and  Second  Order  Empirical  Expectations  (SOEE)  should  be 
compatible with the choice dictated by the rule. In our data, SOEE are in line 
with FOEE (see result 1). Moreover, FOEE influence the subjects’ decisions 
(see result 3 and result 4), and participation in the agreement has a significant 
impact  on  the  decision  to  comply  (result  4.).  This  results  gives  support  to 
Sacconi and Grimalda’s theory of conformist preferences.  
On the other hand, Bicchieri’s theory seems to be less robust. According to 
hypothesis H3b, both First Order Empirical Expectations (FOEE) and Second 
Order  Normative  Expectations  (SONE)  in  line  with  the  rule  selected  are 
necessary to predict compliance. To check this point we isolate the subgroup 
of subjects who comply with the rule selected and whose FOEE are in line 
with it. We obtain a subgroup of 14 subjects in the AT and 14 subjects in the 
OT. When we analyse the correlation between SONE and choice it turns out 
that they are correlated neither in the AT (Spearman correlation coefficient; p 
= 0.23) nor among the insiders in the OT (Spearman correlation coefficient; p 
=  0.5).  They  are  only  slightly  correlated  among  the  outsiders  in  the  OT 
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4. Conclusions 
The aim of this paper has been twofold. Firstly, it has focused on the decision-
making process that leads to the creation of a social norm. Secondly, it has 
analysed the mechanisms through which subjects conform their behaviour to 
the norm.  
We can summarize our results as follows. 
1)  The subjects’ choices are in line with their empirical expectations, and 
when normative and empirical expectations are in contrast, the latter 
play a more important role in the players’ decisions (H1).  
2)  Agreement is reached in all groups (H2). 
3)  Even  a  non-binding  agreement  induces  convergence  of  empirical 
expectations  and,  consequently,  of  choices  (H3).  Moreover,  this 
finding confirms the robustness of the results obtained by Faillo and 
Sacconi  (2008).  In  particular,  it  is  perfectly  in  line  with  the 
“conditional  compliance”  hypothesis,  according  to  which  subjects 
comply with a norm if they believe that other members of their group 
will  comply  and  if  they  believe  that  other  members  of  their  group 
expect that they will comply (H3b). 
4)  The  results  of  the  Outsider  Treatment  seems  to  suggest  that 
participation in the agreement is a necessary condition for compliance. 
When groups are rematched and one of the players A (the outsider) is 
assigned to a new group, the members of her new group (the insiders) 
do  not  expect  compliance  from  her,  and  consequently  they  do  not 
comply  (H3b).  The  outsider  seems  to  acknowledge  this,  and,  on 
expecting non-compliance by the insiders, she does not comply.  
5)  Our last result (a generally non significant correlation between Second 
Order  Normative  Expectations  and  choice  of  conformity)  does  not 
confirm the hypothesis that both first order empirical expectations and 
second  order  normative  expectations  are  necessary  conditions  for 
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Figure 1. Treatments 
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Table 1. Experimental Design 
 
Treatment  Voting 
Procedure  Matching  Sessions  Subjects 
BT  NO  Partner Protocol  2 in Trento (T) 
1 in Milan (M) 
36 (T) + 20 (M) 
9 groups (T) + 5 groups 
(M) 
(27 (T) + 15 (M) players 
A) 
AT  YES  Partner Protocol  2 in Trento (T) 
2 in Milan (M) 
36 (T) + 36 (M) 
9 groups (T) + 9 groups 
(M) 
(27 (T) + 27 (M) players 
A) 
OT  YES 
Mixed – Partner 
and Stranger 
Protocol 
2 in Trento (T) 
3 in Milan (M) 
32 (T) + 56 (M) 
8 groups (T) + 14 groups 
(M) 
(24 (T) + 42 (M) players 
A) 




Table 2. Beliefs and choices 
  It is possible to explain subjects’ behaviour through… 
  FOEE  FONE  OTHER 
BT 
T (N = 27) 








T (N = 27) 








T (N = 24) 








FOEE= First Order Empirical Expectation. 
FONE= First Order Normative Expectations. 
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When FOEE and FONE are different it is possible to explain subjects’ behaviour 
through… 
  FOEE  FONE  OTHER 
BT 
T (N = 14) 








T (N = 11) 








T (N = 14) 







FOEE= First Order Empirical Expectation. 
FONE= First Order Normative Expectations. 
    Rule 
    15 – 15 – 15 – 15    18 – 18 – 18 – 6    20 – 20 – 20 – 0 
AT  88.9%  8/9    11.1%  1/9    0.0%  0/9 
Trento 
OT  87.5%  7/8    12.5%  1/8    0.0%  0/8 
                 
Milano 
AT  100.0%  9/9    0.0%  0/9    0.0%  0/9 
  OT  92.9%  13/14    0.0%  0/14    7.1%  1/14   23 











Table 6. Compliance by University x Treatment.  
  
  AT  OT 












     
AT  44.4%  12/27 
10 rule 15 - 2 rule 18 
OT 
  29.2%  7/24 
OT 
(Insiders)  37.5%  6/16 
5 rule 15 - 1 rule 18 
Trento 
OT 
(Outsiders)  12.5%  1/8 
1 rule 15 
     
AT  55.5%  15/27 
15 rule 15 
OT  45.2%  19/42 
OT 
(Insiders)  39.3%  11/28 




(Outsiders)  57.1%  8/14 
7 rule 15 - 1 rule 20   24 


















    15 - 18    20 
BT 
(N = 27)  15.0%    85.0% 
Trento 
AT 
(N = 27)  20.0%    80.0% 
           
BT 
(N = 15)  52.0%    48.0%  Milano 
AT 
(N = 27)  69.0%    31.0% 
     
AT  40.7%        11/27  Trento 
OT  20.8%         5/24 
   
AT  51.8%        14/27 
 
Milano 
OT  30.9%        13/42   25 
Appendix 1– The beliefs elicitation procedure 
 
 
Data on subjects’ expectations were collected by means of a questionnaire. 
We used two different questionnaires, one for the Baseline and the Agreement 
treatments and one for the Outsider treatment.  
 
BASELINE TREATMENT AND AGREEMENT TREATMENT 
 
Let us identify the three active members of the group (players A) as Ax, Ay 
and Az. The questions were exactly the same for the three players. By way of 
example, we take the point of view of player Ax. 
 
1.  First Order Empirical Expectations (FOEE) 
 
“You are participant Ax. According to you, what is the probability (expressed 
in percentage terms) that Ay has made the following choices: 
 
  CHOICE   PROBABILITY 
 
S/he has asked for 15 tokens    [    ] 
 
S/he has asked for 18 tokens   [    ] 
 
S/he has asked for 20 tokens   [    ] 
 
 
Remember that the three percentages must add up to 100%” 
 
(We asked the subject if this probability would hold for player Az as well. If 
not, s/he could enter different values for Az. Thus, each subject answered two 
questions on FOEE.) 
 
 
2. Second Order Empirical Expectations (SOEE) 
 
“You are participant Ax. We now ask you to assign a probability (expressed in 
percentage  terms)  to  each  of  these  hypotheses  regarding  the  probabilities 
assigned to your choice by participant Ay 
 
  HYPOTHESIS                     PROB. 
 
According to Ay, my most probable choice has been to ask for 15 tokens    [    ] 
 
According to Ay, my most probable choice has been to ask for 18 tokens    [    ] 
 
According to Ay, my most probable choice has been to ask for 20 tokens    [    ]   26 
 
According to Ay, all my three choices are almost equiprobable         [    ] 
  
According to Ay, only two of my three choices are almost equiprobable     [    ] 
 
Remember that the five percentages must add up to 100%” 
 
(We asked the subject if this probability would hold for player Az as well. If 
not, s/he could enter different values for Az. In this ways each subject were 




3 First Order Normative Expectations (FONE) 
 
 
“Think of a generic participant A. What is the right number of tokens that  
s/he should ask for?    
 
I think the right number of tokens is 15      [    ] 
 
I think the right number of tokens is 18      [    ] 
 





3 Second Order Normative Expectations (SONE) 
 
 
“Think of a generic participant A. What do you think is her/his opinion about 
the right number of tokens that a generic participant A should ask for? 
 
I think s/he believes that the right number of tokens is 15.        [    ] 
 
I think s/he believes that the right number of tokens is 18        [    ] 
 
I think s/he believes that the right number of tokens is 20         [    ] ”  
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OUTSIDER TREATMENT 
 
In this treatment we have to distinguish between the members of the group 
who  have  voted  for  the  rule  and  are  still  in  their  original  group  and  the 
Outsider (the subject who come from a different group). We use “Ax” and 





1. First Order Empirical Expectations (FOEE) 
 
Questions for the Ax and Ay members 
 
“You  are  participant  Ax  (Ay).  According  to  you,  what  is  the  probability 
(expressed in percentage terms) that Ay (Ax) has made the following choices: 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
 
“You  are  participant  Ax  (Ay).  According  to  you,  what  is  the  probability 
(expressed in percentage terms) that AO (the participant coming from another 
group) has made the following choices: 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Question for the AO members 
 
“You are participant AO. According to you, what is the probability (expressed 
in percentage terms) that Ay (Ax) has made the following choices: 
 




2. Second Order Empirical Expectations (SOEE) 
 
 
Questions for the Ax and Ay members 
 
“You  are  participant  Ax  (Ay).  We  now  ask  you  to  assign  a  probability 
(expressed  in  percentage  terms)  to  each  of  these  hypotheses  regarding  the 
probabilities assigned to your choice by participant Ay(Ax). 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
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“You  are  participant  Ax  (Ay).  We  now  ask  you  to  assign  a  probability 
(expressed  in  percentage  terms)  to  each  of  these  hypotheses  regarding  the 
probabilities  assigned  to  your  choice  by  participant  AO  (the  participant 
coming from another group): 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Question for the AO members 
 
“You are participant AO. We now ask you to assign a probability (expressed 
in percentage terms) to each of these hypotheses regarding the probabilities 
assigned to your choice by participant Ax (Ay): 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
 
3 First Order Normative Expectations (FONE) 
 
Questions for the Ax, Ay and AO members 
 
“Think of a generic participant A who is still in her/his original group. What 
is the right number of tokens that s/he should ask for?  (FONE1) 
  
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
 
“Think of a generic participant A who is in a group which is not her/his 
original one. What is the right amount of tokens that she/he should ask for?  
(FONE2) 
 




4 Second Order Normative Expectations (SONE) 
 
Questions for the AO members 
 
“Think of a generic participant A who is still in her/his original group . What 
do you think is her/his opinion with regard to the right number of tokens that a 
participant A who is still in her/his original group should ask for ?” 
 (SONE1) 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
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“Think of a generic participant A who is still in her/his original group . What 
do you think is her/ his opinion with regard to the right number of tokens that 
a participant A who is not in her/his original group should ask for ?” 
 
 (SONE2) 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Questions for the Ax and Ay members 
 
Think of a  participant  A who is still in her/his original group . What do you 
think is her/his opinion with regard to the right number of tokens that a 
participant A who is still in her/his original group should ask for ? 
 (SONE3) 
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Think of a  participant A who is still in her/his original group . What do you 
think is her/his opinion with regard to the right number of tokens that a 
participant  A who is not in her/his original group should ask for ? 
 (SONE4) 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
  
 
“Think of a participant A who is not in her/his original group . What do you 
think is her/his opinion of the other participant A with regard to the right 
number of tokens that a participant A who is still in her/his original group 
should ask for ?” 
 (SONE5)   
 
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Think of a participant A who is not in her/his original group . What do you 
think is her/his opinion of the other participant A with regard to the right 
number of tokens that a participant A who is not in her/his original group 
should ask for ? 
 (SONE6)   
(same options as in the other two treatments) 
 
Subjects were paid only for the accuracy of their guesses in FOEE and SOEE 
questions according the Quadratic Scoring Rule (Davis and Holt, 1993). 
 
 
When  we  examine  the  relation  between  subjects’  choices  and  beliefs,  we 
consider only first order expectations (both empirical and normative). This is 
due to a preliminary analysis on beliefs. We first analyse First Order Empirical 
Expectations (FOEE) and Second Order Empirical Expectations (SOEE). In 
particular, we want to check whether what subjects think the others have done 
is in line with what they think the others expect s/he had done. We find that   30 
there is no difference between FOEE and SOEE in all the treatments (p < 0.06, 
Fisher-exact test in the BT; p > 0.45, Wilcoxon test in the AT; p > 0.15, 
Wilcoxon test in the OT).
12 
We  then  check  whether  this  is  also  the  case  when  considering  normative 
expectations. In the BT, it turns out that First Order Normative Expectations 
(FONE)  and  Second  Order  Normative  Expectations  SONE  are  not 
significantly different ( p = 0.000, Fisher-exact test). In the AT, FONE are 
slightly lower than SONE (p = 0.09, Wilcoxon test), but highly correlated (p = 
0.0002,  Spearman  correlation  test).  In  the  OT  the  analysis  is  rather  more 
complicated  because  we  have  two  different  kinds  of  active  players  –  the 
outsiders  and  the  insiders.  Consequently,  normative  beliefs  concern  both  a 
generic insider and a generic outsider rather than a generic player A – as in the 
BT  and  in  the  AT.  This  increase  the  number  of  normative  expectations 
(FONE1, FONE2, SONE1, SONE2, SONE3, SONE4, SONE5 and SONE6) 
and the number of possible comparisons. With respect to the outsiders, we 
compare FONE1 with SONE1 and FONE2 with SONE2. We find that FONE1 
and SONE1 are not significantly different (p = 0.34, Wilcoxon test), while 
FONE2 are slightly lower than SONE2 (p = 0.05, Wilcoxon test). However, 
when  we  compared  SONE2  with  choices,  it  turns  out  that  they  are  not 
significantly correlated (p = 0.41, Spearman correlation test). Concerning the 
insiders, we compared FONE1 with SONE2 and SONE5, as well as FONE2 
with  SONE4  and  with  SONE6.  In  all  cases  we  find  that  they  are  not 
significantly different (p > 0.31, Wilcoxon test). Finally, we check whether 
players think that a normative choice does not depend on the role (outsider vs 
insider). We compare FONE1 with FONE2 and found out that they are not 
significantly different for both the outsiders (p = 0.34, Wilcoxon test) and the 
insiders (p = 0.19, Wilcoxon test).  
To sum up, we find that second order expectations are generally in line with 
first order expectations. This makes it to study the relation between choices 
and beliefs by taking only first order expectations into account.  
  
                                                 
12 We would stress that when the tests are run, the independence of observations is taken into 
account. In particular, in the BT each player’s observation is independent from all the other 
players’  observations.  In  the  AT,  independent  observations  are  the  group’s  average 
observations. In the OT, the insiders’ independent observations are again the group’s average 
observations, while the outsiders’ independent observations are the average observations of 
the interchanged outsiders.    31 






(R1)  is  a  probit  regression  that  we  implement  to  explore  what  variables 
influence the subjects’ probability of expecting that the others have chosen 20. 
The dependent variable is the dichotomous variable FOEE_20, which is equal 
to 1 if a subject expects the others to have chosen 20. The control variables are 
both  related  to  the  nature  of  the  experiment  (AT,  FIRST*AT,  TENT)  and 
demographic (AGE). We exclude the variable GENDER since it turns out that 
in  the  first  two  treatments  GENDER  and  AGE  are  significantly  correlated 
(Pearson coefficient; p < 0.01) – the women are significantly older than the 
men (ttest; p = 0.002). AT is a dummy equal to 1 if the AT is played. TENT is 
the  number  of  voting  rounds  for  the  group  before  it  reaches  a  unanimous 
decision on the rule to be used – variable equal to 0 when the BT is played. 
FIRST*AT is an interaction term equal to 0 either when the BT is played or 
when the player in the AT have participated in other experiments in the past. 
 
Probit Model – R1  
 
Variables            FOEE_20      Marginal Effects        
 
AT   -2.1***  -0.58       
  (0.478)        
FIRST*AT  -1.29***  -0.47     
  (0.453)    
AGE  -0.10    -0.03 
  (0.073)    
TENT  0.39**    0.13 
  (0.169) 
     
Constant  3.77***   
  (1.643)    
 
N    96         
Log Likelihood    -39891664 
LR chi2(4)    42.43 
Prob > chi2    0.000     
 
***significance 1% 
** significance 5% 
 
                                                 
13 Multicollinearity – a usual problem of probit regressions – is detected using VIF tests.   32 
(R1) show that subjects are more likely to expect selfish behaviour by the co-
players in the BT. Moreover, it emerges that, in the AT, the higher the number 
of voting rounds before the group reaches a unanimous decision on the rule to 
be used, the higher the probability of the subjects expecting selfish behaviour 
by the co-players. Finally, in the AT, a player who has never participated in 
other experiments in the past has a higher probability of asking for a sum 






(R2) is a bivariate recursive probit regression
14 where CHOICE_20 is equal to 
1 if subject i choose 20 tokens. It makes it possible to check: 1) the relation 
among agreement, beliefs and choices; 2) whether there is any latent variable 
that might influence beliefs and choices at the same time. 
 
Bivariate Recursive Probit Model – R2 
 
Variables            FOEE_20      CHOICE_20        
 
AT   -2.87***         
  (0.57)         
FIRST*AT  -1.4***  -0.04     
  (0.422)   (0.433) 
AGE  -0.15*   0.11 
  (0.085)   (0.095) 
TENT  0.40** 
  (0.168) 
FOEE_20      2.42*** 
      (0.712) 
     
Constant  8.16***  -4.38* 
  (2.3)    (2.365) 
 
N    96         
Log Likelihood    -73.623096 
Rho    0.287 
Prob > chi2    0.47     
 
***significance 1%  ** significance 5%  *  significance 10% 
                                                 
14 A variation of the analysis run by Di Novi (2007).   33 
(R2)  shows  that  the  agreement  influences  empirical  expectations  and  that 
empirical expectations influence the subjects’ decisions. Moreover, because 
rho is not significantly different from 0, we can state that there is no latent 







(R3)  is  a  probit  regression  that  we  implement  to  explore  what  variables 
influence the subjects’ probability of expecting that the others have chosen the 
voted  rule.  The  dependent  variable  is  the  dichotomous  variable  EQFOEE, 
which is equal to 1 if a subject expect the others to have chosen the voted rule. 
The control variables are all related to the nature of the experiment (FIRST 
and  TENT).  We  exclude  all  demographic  variables  because  there  is  no 
significant difference due to gender (chi2; p = 0.97) and the variables AGE 
and FIRST are significantly correlated (Pearson coefficient; p < 0.05).  
 
Probit Model - R3  
 
Variables            EQFOEE      Marginal Effects        
 
OT   -0.48**  -0.18       
  (0.242)        
FIRST  0.32     0.118     
  (0.247)    
TENT  -0.09     -0.03 
  (0.069) 
     
Constant  0.01   
  (0.253)    
 
N    120         
Log Likelihood    -74.073703 
LR chi2(3)    8.44 
Prob > chi2    0.0539     
 
** significance 5% 
 
(R3)  shows  that  subjects  are  more  likely  to  expect  compliance  by  the  co-
players in the AT. 





As in the comparison between the BT and the AT, we compare the AT and the 
OT by running a bivariate recursive probit (R4) where EQCHOICE is equal to 
1 if the choice corresponds to the voted rule.  
 
 Bivariate Recursive Probit Model – R4 
 
Variables            EQFOEE      EQCHOICE        
 
OT   -0.47**         
  (0.243)        
FIRST  0.40         
  (0.27)     
AGE      0.05 
      (0.057) 
TENT  -0.07 
  (0.092) 
EQFOEE      2.39*** 
      (0.945) 
     
Constant  -0.09    -2.065 
  (0.342)   (1.284) 
 
N    120         
 
Log Likelihood    -133.37077 
 
Rho    -0.51 
 




** significance 5% 
 
(R4)  shows  that  introduction  of  the  mixed  protocol  influences  empirical 
expectations  and  that  empirical  expectations  influenced  the  subjects’ 
decisions. Moreover, because rho is not significantly different from 0, we can 
state that there is no latent variable influencing beliefs and choices at the same 
time. 